Mining for Influence: Russian Leverage over Global Uranium Production 

Russia’s influence over uranium supply has been greatly underestimated. The World Nuclear Association portrays Russia as a minor uranium producer, its domestic mines contributing 4.5% of global output in 2024. Taking Russia’s overseas uranium mines into account, however, the figure is five times that amount.

Russia’s share of global output from its existing and committed mines is set to rise to one-third by 2040. This will occur against a backdrop of declining global production and a tripling in demand. In the worst case scenario, this figure could rise to as much as 45% of nominal production capacity among major uranium sources by the end of the next decade.

OECD nations, meanwhile, are seeking to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear services, the Sapporo 5 having invested $5.6 billion in expanding their own conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication capacity. Security of uranium supplies, however, has not yet been addressed. If left uncontested, Russia will be able to reassert its leverage over the civil nuclear industry, not through front-end services but by control of uranium supplies.

This report reconstitutes production capacity data to reflect control rather than origin of uranium supplies, how this is projected to generate Russian leverage if uncontested, and a series of actions that can be taken to mitigate this risk.